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WHO IS A PARENT?:
THE NEED TO DEVELOP A
LESBIAN CONSCIOUS FAMILY LAW
PaulaL. Ettelbrick

L Introduction
Let's start this discussion with a simple fact: Lesbians, in
numbers unprecedented in history, are raising children.' Some are
raising children as single parents, some as two mother households.
Some conceived through sexual intercourse, some through donor
insemination. Some did not conceive at all, but adopted. Some are
sharing parenting with men who are donors, some with close male
friends, and some with ex-husbands. Some are raising children
within the context of a so-called "new" lesbian family, while others
are raising the children conceived in the course of a heterosexual
relationship.
Let's also start this discussion with a simple question: How
should the law respond to these facts? Just by posing this question,

* Director of Public Policy, National Center for Lesbian Rights; former Legal
Director, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund; B.A., Northern Illinois
University, 1978; J.D., Wayne State University Law School, cum laude, 1984. The
author would like to warmly thank Rebecca Koch for her invaluable commitment of
time, intelligence, and patience in assisting with the completion of this article, and
Suzanne Goldberg for her comments and suggestions.
'Although it would be absolutely impossible to obtain an accurate figure, households
headed by lesbians are estimated to be between 1.5 and 5 million. Patricia J. Falk,

Lesbian Mothers: PsychosocialAssumptionsin Family Law, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 941,941
(1989). The minimum number of children raised in gay or lesbian households is
between 8 and 10 million. Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law,
102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1629 (1989) (citing ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for
Family Law Experts, 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1512, 1513 (Aug. 25, 1987)). The
purpose for citing such uncitable numbers is to emphasize that the more people there are
that are affected by virtue of their family status, the more imperative it is for the law to
address the issues related to lesbians having children.
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I am assuming that the law should respond. Some courts say that
lesbians are not fit to raise children in the first place, while many
reject that view. 2 Some say that only biological parents may be
legally recognized as parents, 3 while others say that it is not biology
but marriage that matters. 4 Some say that the agreement between
two lesbian mothers with regard to their childrearing decisions should
be given some validity,' while others huddle close to strict legislative7
decrees.6 Some say we should look to who functions as a parent,
while others challenge the functional approach as too prone to abuse.'
We see right away that the question is not really so simple.
Nor is there any easy answer. While it might offer some insight for
numerous parenting situations, this discussion will focus primarily on
one of the factual situations mentioned above: lesbian couples who
choose to have children together, separate at some later point, and
struggle over what parenting rights the non-legal mother will or will
not have. The perspective offered is one of an advocate with
extensive involvement in most, if not all, of the central cases
discussed, and a long-time advocate for the legal recognition of
lesbian and gay families in general.
The basic theory is this: The experiences of lesbians having
children cannot be addressed by trying to fit them into a family law
system that is so resolutely heterosexual in its structure and
presumptions.
The law must be developed according to the

2 Compare G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating the
environment in which the child would be placed "would not be a healthy one" if custody
was granted to the lesbian mother) with S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska
1985) ("In marked contrast to the wealth of testimony that Mother is a lesbian, there is
no suggestion that this has or is likely to affect the child adversely.").
3 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
4 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-20 (1989) (plurality opinion).
5 A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); In re Z.J.H., 471
N.W.2d 202, 213 (Wis. 1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
6 Nancy S.v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 passim (Ct. App. 1991).
7Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 464 (1990).
' See generally Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62

U. COLO. L. REv. 269 (1991).
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perspectives and experiences of lesbians ,9 in much the same way that
some advocate that it be developed to fit the experiences of women 0
and people of color."
As part of the evolving "outsider
jurisprudence,"' 2 a lesbian family law jurisprudence must continue to
emerge. The experiences of lesbians having children, and the method
by which the law responds, must stand apart from heterosexual

experience.
Thus, we must start with the fact that the very basic
experiences of lesbians with regard to parenting are different from
those of men and heterosexual women. Any rule of law that
presumes marriage to be a determining factor for legal recognition as

9 One commentator has noted:
A legal theory that is lesbian puts lesbians at its theoretical center:
lesbians of all colors, all classes, all cultures, all abilities, all ages,
all politics, all sexual practices, and all spiritualities. . . . The
insistence on an independent lesbian legal theory is just as necessary
if lesbianism is not to be eclipsed by feminist and queer theories.
RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW:

SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 22
(1992).
o See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV.

1279, 1279 (1987); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 11-12 (1987).
" See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voices of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 202233 (1991). See also Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Realty
Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 95 n.1 (1990). Naturally, one cannot generalize aboit the
experience of any one group as a class as no single woman's or Black lesbian's
experiences will speak for the entire group. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntiDiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139.
12 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989).
Matsuda uses the term "outsider
jurisprudence" to refer to the work of feminists and people of color who are grounding
their legal theories in the experiences of women and/or people of color in an attempt to
raise the voices of outsiders in the law. "Like the feminists who have shown that
patriarchy has had its own march through history, related to but distinct from the march
of class struggle, scholars of color have shown how racism is a separate, distinct, and
central phenomenon in American life." Id. at 2325. So, too, in family law in
particular, have heterosexist presumptions and ideals not only kept the voices of lesbians
from being heard, but have kept our families vulnerable to the state's discretion and
homophobic beliefs.
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a parent inherently discriminates against lesbian families for the
simple reason that lesbian couples are not allowed to marry." Rules

that presume that the biological connection between parent and child
outweighs all other claims to parenting likewise eliminate the
possibility that the relationship between a non-biological lesbian
mother and the child she is raising with her partner will ever be
recognized. 14 Therefore, the unique experiences of lesbians must be
taken into account in developing the law. Just as laws based on male
experience do not work for women, laws which draw only from
heterosexual experience do not work for lesbians.
I. Lesbian Families: The CurrentLandscape
As lesbian couples continue to have children in historically
unprecedented numbers," either through donor insemination or
adoption, 6 the question of who may be considered a "parent"
becomes both more urgent and more frequently asked. Typically, a

" See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (Washington's
marriage statutes do not permit same-sex marriage and are not violative of state's equal
rights amendment); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (Kentucky
statutes do not allow same-sex marriage and court "find[s] no constitutional sanction or
protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex."); Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(interpreting Minnesota's marriage statute to prohibit same-sex marriage and finding
statute constitutional).
'" See Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (N.Y. 1987) (petitioner was
not entitled to visitation rights, even though he at one time was believed to be the child's
father, was listed as the father on the child's birth certificate, and acted as the child's
father).
is See generally CNN Live Report: Can Gays Make Good Parents? (CNN television
broadcast, Dec. 29, 1992) (5000 children are born to lesbian women each year); Anne
Pressley & Nancy Andrews, For Gay Couples, the Nursery Becomes the New Frontier,
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1992, at Al (gay rights groups estimate eight to ten million
children are being raised by four million gay men and lesbians).
" See Anne Pressley & Nancy Andrews, For Gay Couples, the Nursery Becomes the
New Frontier, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1992, at Al (beginning in the 1980s, an increasing
number of gay men and lesbians are having the families they want through adoption,
artificial insemination, and surrogate motherhood); Sally Jacobs, More Gay Men Hearing
the Call of Fatherhood, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 1992, at 1 (there are clear indications
that gay fatherhood is on the rise).
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lesbian couple will decide to have a child and agree that both will
raise their child as co-equal parents, despite the fact that only one

may be a biological or adoptive parent. 7 Both women plan for the
pregnancy, share in providing financial and emotional support for the
child, and assume child care responsibilities.

The child may bear

each of their family names as a symbol of her familial tie to each
parent. By all objective criteria, they function as a family unit, and
the parents convey to the child the fact that she or he lives in a family

with two mothers. 8
Unfortunately for these families, particularly the children, the
laws pertaining to families, whether defining rights, obligations, or
bestowing benefits, are silent with regard to their particular needs.' 9
Virtually all family-related laws presume that family members are
heterosexual and most assume that the family has as its base two
people who are married. While these laws fail to account for most
families, they particularly ignore the deeply committed and loving
relationships of many of the approximately twenty-five million

17 Most states' adoption laws do not explicitly allow unmarried couples to adopt
simultaneously. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 110(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1993) ("An adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult wife together may
adopt another person."). Nonetheless, courts have begun to recognize that the child's
interests are best served by allowing a non-biological co-parent to legally adopt her
partner's biological child as a "second parent." See Matter of Evan, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3,
1992, at 25 (Fam. Ct. Feb. 2, 1992). See also Carrie Bashaw, Protecting Children in
NontraditionalFamilies: Second ParentAdoptions in Washington, 13 U. PUGET SoUND
L. REv. 321 (1990); Elizabeth Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for LesbianParentedFamilies: LegalRecognitionofthe Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729
(1986).
" See SARA B., Two Are Better Than One, in DIFFERENT MOTHERS: SONS AND
DAUGHTERS OF LESBIANS TALK ABOUT THEIR LIVES (Louise Rafkin ed., 1990); GAY
AND LESBIAN PARENTS (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987).
'" Some family-related laws are not so silent with regard to lesbians and gay men.
For example, New Hampshire and Florida explicitly prohibit lesbians and gay men from
being adoptive parents. See- N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1991) (providing:
"[slpecifically as follows, any individual not a minor and not a homosexual may adopt
.... ) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (1991) ("No person eligible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is homosexual."). However, at least two
lower courts in Florida have ruled that the state law banning adoptions by lesbians and
gay men is unconstitutional. See Cox v. Dry, No. 91-3491 CA-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar.
5, 1993); Seebol v. Farie, 59 U.S.L.W. 2727 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991).
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lesbians and gay men who live in this country," many of whom are
in committed partnerships. Nor does the law in any but the rarest
cases recognize the millions of children who live with their lesbian or
gay parents and their partners.21 Though minimal recognition has
been granted to lesbian and gay couples through domestic partnership
laws,22 judicial interpretations of "family,"' enforcement of
contractual agreements between lesbian partners,24 and granting of
"second parent" adoptions,' the failure of the law to recognize and
accept the existence and needs of lesbian couples, particularly those
with children, leaves them vulnerable and fearful of losing their
families. When tragedy strikes in a lesbian family -- the death of a
" The latest census figures indicate that the U.S. population is approximately 250
million. Population: 1900 to 1991, in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (112th ed. 1992). Experts have estimated that the
percentage of gay men and lesbians in the national population is nearly ten percent.
Barbara Vobejda, Unmarried Partner Category to Provide First Census Data on Gays,
WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1990, at A6.
21 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting). In her dissent from the New York Court of Appeals' decision holding that
a nonbiological lesbian co-parent was not a "parent" under the state visitation statute, and
was therefore not entitled to standing to seek visitation, Judge Kaye charged that "[tihe
impact of today's decision falls hardest on the children of those relationships, limiting
their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development." Id.
I At least 25 cities, counties, and states have instituted domestic partnerships, which
enable a registered, unmarried couple - straight, gay, or lesbian -- to enjoy certain
benefits traditionally reserved for married couples. For instance, New York City's
recently established domestic partnership registration allows registered partners who
work for the City to take the same unpaid newborn child care leave as married workers,
and grants registrants the same visiting privileges that are accorded married spouses in
municipal hospitals and city jails. Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold Is Crossed By
Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al, B3; Alan Finder, Rights
of'Domestic Partners' Broadened by Dinkins Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at Al.
I See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53 (N.Y. 1989) (concluding that the
term "family" in New York City rent control law noneviction provision should not be
narrowly construed to cover only legally sanctioned, traditional families). See also In
re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to lesbian couple
as a "family of affinity").
24 See Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645, 646 (Ga. 1992) (contract involving two
partners in a same-sex relationship is not void on grounds of immorality or illegality).
I See Matter of Evan, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 25 (Fain. Ct. Feb. 2, 1992); In
re Nancy L.M., No. 18744, (Cal. Super. Ct. June 11, 1990); In re E.B.G., No. 87-500137-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1989); In re Adoption of A Minor Child, No. 1
Ju-86-73 P/A (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1987).
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partner or the couple's separation -- the survivors are often left
defenseless against a heterosexist legal system. 26
Negotiating this terrain on behalf of a lesbian non-biological
parent who seeks nothing more than the opportunity to maintain
visitation with the child she helped conceive and raise with a former
partner is a nightmare. Based on personal experience and a review
of the first decisions in this area, one conclusion in particular can be
drawn: Courts cannot analyze lesbian family issues by using a
heterosexual model. In this area of parental recognition the law must
be analyzed and developed according to the actual experiences of
lesbians who are having children. Treating them as heterosexual
equivalents will not work for the simple reason that a lesbian couple
who has children together cannot both be biologically related to each
of their children. Furthermore, since they are precluded from
marriage, 27 there is no statutory presumption available to them that
would presume the partner of the biological mother to be the child's
legal parent.
111. The Courts and Lesbian Co-Parents
Like many things in the law, the determination of who is a
parent is, in large measure, morality laden. In a heterosexist culture,
where marriage is the ultimate socially acceptable relationship, it is
not surprising to find that custody and visitation decisions often turn
on the marital status or relationship of one seeking a determination of
parental rights. Even biological relationships do not seem to govern
the question of who is a parent. For example, an undisputed
biological father who held himself out as a parent and lived for a
prolonged period of time with his lover and their child, is denied the
opportunity to assert his status as a father where the child's mother
was married to another man and has resumed living with her

Fortunately, in some instances where the lesbian biological mother has died, courts
have awarded custody of the surviving child to the deceased's partner where that partner
was functioning as the second parent. See In re Pearlman, No. 87-24926DA (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 31, 1989).
2 See supra note 13.
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husband.2"
According to the Supreme Court, it is most important to
protect the relationships within the "unitary family," which "is
typified, of course, by the marital family." 29 Likewise, a man who
lives with a woman, and believes himself to be the child's father,
holds himself out as such, but is not married to her, can claim no
parental relationship, ° though a man who marries a woman with
children, whom he knows are not his children, may at least be
accorded standing to seek visitation as a stepparent when the marriage
ends."
Despite the rather obvious way in which many
heterosexually-defined families are discounted in the heterosexual
world, the courts look to marriage as a unifying principle governing
definitions of family and parenthood.
It is within this basic rubric that we face the challenge of
representing lesbians who are having children with their partners.3 2
And it is against this backdrop that we must develop the rules
governing the parental relationships between each parent and the child
or children after the lesbian couple has separated, despite the fact that
the legal and family law system has only rarely acknowledged the
possibility of lesbian families.3" Fortunately, some state courts have
' Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (plurality opinion).
9 Id. at 123 n.3 (emphasis added). Michael H. involved a challenge to California's
Civil Code § 621, which presumes that a child born to a woman living with her husband
is the legitimate child of the marriage. Id. at 113. According to Justice Scalia, whose
hope it was that the facts of the case are "extraordinary," the law "like nature itself,
makes no provision for dual fatherhood." Id. at 118.
" Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987).
3' Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, where a married man
has discovered only upon divorce that he is not a child's biological father, courts have
reached out to develop entirely new rules in order to declare him a parent. See Atkinson
v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, appeal denied, 429 Mich. App. 884 (Ct. App. 1987).
32 Because the initial cases presented to the courts have involved two-parent lesbian
families who have either adopted or conceived through an unknown donor, most
discussion will focus on this family type. There are many constellations of family within
the lesbian community. The important point is that the legal theories we have developed
have emphasized not the particular family form, but the question of 1) the agreement
between or among the parents, 2) the actual functioning of the parties as parents, and 3)
the children's best interests. Unlike Justice Scalia, I believe that nature - at least human
nature - like loving and caring, makes provisions for dual motherhood.
31 See In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (lesbian couple
called a "family of affinity").
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been willing to recognize that the world would not come to an end if
two parents of the same sex are each recognized as having a parental
relationship with a child, in the same way that the law grants such
recognition 4to a couple that consists of a biological parent and a
3

stepparent.

At best, courts have dealt unevenly with custody and visitation
issues when a lesbian couple has ended their relationship, generally
finding that the non-biological mother has no claim or right to
visitation or custody." 5 The lengths to which they will go in ignoring
their own precedents in order to deny legal status to lesbian coparents can only be explained by an underlying, though unstated,
antipathy towards lesbians and the "immorality" of lesbian parenting,
which follows neither the tradition of marriage nor biology. Two
cases, both decided by the highest courts of their respective states,
best illustrate the difficulty of breaking through traditional notions of

I

See Mark V. v. Gale P., 540 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (Fain. Ct. 1990) (granting
primary custodial rights to biological father and secondary subordinate rights to
stepfather); Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 325-26 (W. Va. 1989) (granting
custody to biological father and visitation to stepfather); Collins v. Gilbreath, 403
N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (granting custody to biological father and
visitation to stepfather); Cooper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978)
(granting custody to biological mother and visitation to stepmother). Cf. Michael D.L.
v. Martha P. and Charles P., N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1990, at 28 (Faro. Ct. May 10, 1990)
(holding that married, biological mother is equitably estopped from preventing biological
father from claiming paternity).
' Where death of the biological mother has occurred, courts have been more willing
to reAognize the non-biological mother's parental status, even against claims by
biological grandparents. In In re Pearbnan, the court revoked the adoption by the
child'sI grandparents, finding that it was in the child's best interest to be with her
mother's surviving partner, who had functioned as a second parent. In re Pearlman, No.
87-24926DA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989). In In re Haizopoulous, a Colorado Juvenile
Court awarded custody of a child to her deceased mother's lesbian lover instead of her
aunt and uncle, finding that the custody award was in the child's best interests. The
court noted that the "[pirime criteria to insure the mental health of this child is
permanency and stability, not whether the custodian has a single-parent or a two-parent
household." Custody Awarded to Deceased Mother's Lesbian Lover, 4 Fain. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2075, 2076 (Dec. 6, 1977). See also In re Estate of Hamilton, No. 24,951 (Vt.
P. Ct. July 25, 1989) (mother's will naming lesbian partner guardian of 18-month old
infant upheld, despite opposition of biological grandparents); In re Brian Batey, No.
134752 (San Diego Super. Ct. 1988) (deceased father's male partner awarded custody
of child, rather than his biological mother, because partner was boy's psychological
parent).
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7
parenting: Alison D. v. Virginia M."'and In re Z.J.H.

A. Alison D. v. Virginia M."8
In Alison D. v. Virginia M., the New York Court of Appeals,
the state's highest court, was asked to interpret the statutory term
"parent" to include a lesbian who, though neither biologically nor
legally related to the child, had functioned as a parent.3 9 The case
involved two women, Alison and Virginia, who at one time were a
lesbian couple.4" Like many committed couples, they wanted to raise
children together, to-have a family.4" After lengthy discussions with
family and friends, the two women decided that Virginia would be
inseminated with the sperm of an unknown donor.42 At all times it
was both women's mutual agreement and intent that they would be
joint parents, despite the rather obvious fact that only one of them

s 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
17 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis.
1991).
1 Many of the facts that are included in the discussion of Alison D. come from the
personal knowledge of the author, who represented Alison D.
"' Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991). At issue was
Domestic Relations Law Section 70, which provides:
Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may
apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such
minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the
court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship,
charge and custody of such child to either parent for such time,
under such regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and
directions, as the case may require, and may at any time thereafter
vacate or modify such order. In all cases there shall be no prima
facie right to the custody of the child in either parent, but the court
shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the child, and
what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award
accordingly.
N.Y. DOM. REL.

LAW

§ 70(a) (McKinney 1987).

40 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
41

Id.

42

Id.
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could have
a direct biological relationship with the child."3
*Virginia
conceived and gave birth to their son. Sometime
thereafter, the two women decided to have another child. This time,
Alison was inseminated and gave birth to their daughter. Again, it
was their intent to raise this child jointly. With both children, each
shared in the decisions regarding conception, preparations for
childbirth, financial and emotional devotion to each other and their
children, as well as all of the tangible and non-tangible factors that
contribute to the creation of a family.
Several months after their second child was born, after seven
years together, Alison and Virginia ended their relationship. Though
each had custody of her biological child, they agreed to continue their
involvement in both children's lives. Alison moved out of the family
home with their newly born daughter, but continued to share some
financial responsibility for Virginia and their son. Pursuant to both
women's agreement, Alison also had visitation with their son several
days each week, took him on vacations and to events involving her
extended family, and continued her involvement in his life as his
parent. The continued relationship between Alison and their son
lasted for nearly four years after the women's separation, and took
place with Virginia's full agreement and encouragement. At some
point during the four years after the break-up Virginia began to
reduce the time Alison could share with their son. She cut off
contact altogether when Alison decided to move temporarily to
Dublin, Ireland. At this point, their son was six years old.
The question before the New York Court of Appeals was
whether, based on these facts, Alison could be considered a "parent,"
and thus was entitled to standing to seek visitation." Though it was
the first time in the country that a state's highest court would be
asked to recognize the relationship created by two lesbians with their
child, prior holdings in New York courts supported Alison's
argument that functional parental relationships should be recognized.
Under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, New York's
courts, like many others, had recognized that one who assumes the
obligations of a parent acquires the relative rights and responsibilities

4 Id.

"Id. The term "parent" was not defined by the state legislature for purposes of a
Domestic Relations Law § 70 proceeding. Id. at 31 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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of a parent.45 In conferring standing, New York courts have looked
at the length of time the adult lived in the home with the child,'
whether the adult provided support for the child's welfare,47 or
simply whether the petition for visitation shows patently that the
child's interests were best served by continuing the relationship.4
The court's focus has traditionally been on the nature of the
relationship between the child and the person seeking visitation, not
on biology.49 One lower court in New York used its equitable power
to find that a lesbian non-biological parent should be deemed a parent
and required to fulfill her support obligations to the two children she

'5 In New York, a person may be entitled to in loco parentis status if she intends to
assume all the obligations of parenthood, People v. Lilly, 422 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (App.
Div. 1979); is involved in the child's home, school, recreation and social activities,
Pierce v. Helz, 314 N.Y.S.2d 453, 460-61 (Sup. Ct. 1970); is not receiving
compensation for caring for the child, Miller v. Davis, 268 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (Sup.
Ct. 1966); or intends to provide support for the child's general welfare and has a true
interest in the child's well-being and general welfare, Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143
N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (App. Div. 1955). See also Trapp v. Trapp, 480 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam.
Ct. 1984) (stepfather granted standing to seek visitation where he had lived with children
for nine years); In re Lutz' Estate, 107 N.Y.S.2d 388, 392 (Sur. Ct. 1951) (a blood
relationship between the parties is not necessary to establish a parent-child relationship).
Cf In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 426 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517
(1990) (when state has interest in determining the parental status, the focus should be on
the relationship between father and child rather than between father and mother).
' Trapp v. Trapp, 480 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (Fam. Ct. 1984).
41 See, e.g., Taylor v. Alger, 495 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Fan. Ct. 1985) (step-greatfive years of life has an interest in
grandfather who raised child during formative first
that child's future welfare).
' Humphrey v. Humphrey, 425 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (grandfather and
grandmother granted standing to seek custody when "petition shows patently that the
welfare of the child may require it.").
' See, e.g., In re Jamal B., 465 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (grandmother
stands in loco parentis where she assumed primary responsibility for care of child).
Courts in many jurisdictions have used some form of equitable doctrine or analysis to
confer standing, if not visitation, on defacto parents. See, e.g., Tubwon v. Weisberg,
394 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (husband who was not the biological father has
parental rights as a defacto parent); Wills v. Wills, 399 So.2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (stepmother found to be "psychological mother"); Simpson v. Simpson, 586
S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979) (stepmother stands in loco parentis); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d
64 (Utah 1978) (stepfather is entitled to a hearing to determine if he is entitled to
visitation rights). Cf In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987) (trial court has
authority to grant visitation rights to great-aunt).
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raised with her partner, the children's biological mother.50
However, in a rather tersely worded opinion, the Alison D.
court made no mention of the doctrine of in loco parentis. Instead,
the court referred to Alison as merely a "biological stranger" to her
son,"1 while emphasizing that a child's biological parent has the right
to control the adults with whom her child associates.5 2 The court
ruled that Alison was not a parent under the visitation statute because
she had no legal or biological relationship with the child."3 The court
also failed to engage in a discussion regarding whether its decision
was in the child's best interests.
By contrast, the court's lone dissenter, Judge Judith Kaye,
refused to "fix[ ] biology as the key to visitation rights '"I and rejected
the court's holding, which "firmly closes the door on all
consideration of the child's best interest in visitation proceedings
. . .unless the petitioner is a biological parent."55 Rejecting the
court's narrow interpretation of the term "parent," Judge Kaye argued
that it is, in fact, the court's responsibility to look to "modern-day
realities in giving definition to statutory concepts,"16 and its duty to
give definition to those terms that the legislature has left undefined. 5"

10 Karin T. v. Michael T.,

484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
11Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991). The court used this
same language in Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., where the court referred to the petitioner
as a "biological stranger" to the child. Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 76
(N.Y. 1987).
2 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
s~ Id.
s'id. at 31 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
IId. at 32. It is interesting to note that of the twelve judges who reviewed this case
at various stages, only two judges dissented from the majority opinions on appeal. Both
dissenting judges were women and both were the only women judges to consider the
case. Both judges issued strongly worded dissents admonishing their male colleagues
for taking hard lines in defining "parent," and for refusing to acknowledge the child's
interests in particular. See dissents of Justice Sybil Hart Kooper in Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (App. Div. 1990), and Judge Judith Kaye (now
Chief Judge) in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991).
-"Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30.
57

id.

While acknowledging that relationship [between Alison and the child]
the Court nonetheless proclaims powerlessness to consider the child's
interest at all, because the word "parent" in the statute imposes an
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Aside from the court's refusal to address the in loco parentis
doctrine and its failure to mention the child's best interests, the Alison
D. decision is curious, and somewhat inexplicable, for another
reason. The court failed to give even passing reference to its own
widely applauded 1989 decision in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co. 58 In
Braschi, the New York Court of Appeals became the first high court
in the country to declare that the statutory term "family" could apply
to a gay couple.59 The case involved the state rent control law which
allowed surviving family members to remain in a rent controlled
apartment after the named tenant's death.' The term "family" was
not defined in the regulation, requiring the court to interpret the term
consistent with the legislative goal of the statute, which is to prevent
arbitrary evictions."
The court rejected a narrow interpretation of the term, finding
that "family ... should not be rigidly restricted to those people who
have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a
marriage certificate or an adoption order"62 and that individuals
should not be evicted from their apartments on the basis of "fictitious
legal distinctions or genetic history . ... "63 Rather, the court
proclaimed that it must give effect to the legislative purpose of
preventing sudden eviction and in doing so, interpreted the term
"family" in a manner consistent with "the reality of family life.""
According to the court, "a more realistic, and certainly equally valid,
view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose

absolute barrier to Alison D.'s petition for visitation.... I cannot
agree that such a result is mandated by section 70, or any other law.

Id.
5 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
sid. at 53-54.
60 The statute in question provides that upon the death of a tenant in a rent-control
apartment, the landlord is barred from dispossessing "either the surviving spouse of the
deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been
living with the tenant." Id. at 50 (citing N.Y. CITY RENT & EVICTION REGULATIONS
§ 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987)).
6' Id. at 52.
'1

Id. at 53.

63 d.

" Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53.
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relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and
financial commitment and interdependence." 6' The court posited that
a gay couple with these characteristics comports with "society's
traditional concept of 'family' and with the expectations of individuals
who live in such nuclear units. "66
Though the court took pains to state that its definition of
"family" was limited only to the rent control regulation, it is clear
that the rationale it used to support its broad interpretation of the term
is equally applicable in other family-related contexts. The court in
Braschi stated firmly that interpretation of undefined terms must
further the purpose of the law at issue.67 It eschewed the fictitious
legal distinction between married and unmarried persons, as well as
distinctions between genetically related persons and those who are not
blood relatives when adherence to strict definitions would refute
statutory goals.68 Most notably, the court recognized that a gay
couple could have the legally sanctioned status of family. 69 Whether
one looks at the substance of the Braschi court's holding or at its
rules of statutory interpretation, the decision deserved at least passing
mention in Alison D. Why, then, did the court so obviously avoid a
discussion of Braschi?
Putting aside the substantive ruling of Braschi for a moment,
the Braschi court's statutory interpretation guidelines would certainly
have mandated a different result in Alison D. Like the term "family"
in the rent control regulation, the term "parent" was not defined by
the legislature. 7 ° After Braschi, this factor alone should have lead the
court to at least engage in the intellectual exercise of questioning the
legislature's intent in using the undefined term "parent." Instead, the
court inaccurately stated that Alison D. "concedes that she is not the

Id. at 53-54.
SId. at 54.
67 Id.
a Id.
69 Id. at 53-54.
70 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Other New York domestic relations statutory sections clearly modify "parent" when
necessary. See, e.g., N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 109(1) (McKinney 1992) (adoptive
parents); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(e) (McKinney 1992) (custodial parents).
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child's 'parent,"'71 and automatically shifted Alison into "third
person" status as a "non-parent."
Furthermore, like "family," the term "parent" is as prone to
a functional description as it is to a biological or legal definition.' 2
They are dynamic terms used to describe human relationships and
interactions which frequently defy line drawing. Parent is a subset
of family. One may function as (that is, be) a parent, much as one
may function as (that is, be) a family member. Given that the court
found it within its power and capacity to define family in a functional
sense, it surely is within its power to do so with the term "parent."
It is the functional, or in loco parentis, role that has been given legal
significance. Though the term "parent" refers to a specific family
relationship, the functional indicia that a court would look for to give
it legal effect are similar to what the Braschi court found itself
capable of doing to define family: emotional commitment, financial
support, and living in the same household. The "reality of family
life" must certainly include the equally valid view that not all children
are the biological children of the parents caring for them.
As in Braschi, there was also a strong legislative purpose
behind the statute in Alison D.: furthering the child's best interests."

7'Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.

Alison "conceded" that she was not the child's

biological or adoptive parent, but she certainly never conceded that she was not a parent.
71 Even legal definitions are not uniformly rigid when describing the terms "family"
and "parent." Black's Law Dictionary notes that "[tihe meaning of [the] word 'family'
necessarily depends on [the] field of law in which [the] word is used, [the] purpose
intended to be accomplished by its use, and [the] facts and circumstances of each case."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 604 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). In addition to
traditional notions of "family," which include father, mother, and children, Black's
offers: "A collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or
management," and "such persons as habitually reside under one roof and form the
domestic circle." Id. According to Black's, the term "parent" may be understood
[i]n common and ordinary usage ...[to] comprehend [I much more
than [the] mere fact of who was responsible for [the] child's
conception and birth and is commonly understood to describe and
refer to [a] person or persons who share mutual love and affection
with a child and who supply child support and maintenance,
instruction, discipline and guidance.
Id. at 1114 (citation omitted).
I Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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While the Braschi court referred repeatedly to the legislative goal of
preventing evictions to assist it in broadly defining "family," the
court in Alison D. ignored the very purpose of a visitation
proceeding: to ensure that the child's interests are well served by
maintaining important parental relationships. 74 The same court that
said that the "intended protection against sudden evictions should not
rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history,"71 relied on
those same legal distinctions to deny a lesbian parent the opportunity
to prove that it would be in her child's best interest to continue their
six year parent-child relationship. Instead, the court found that
"parent" applies only to biological parents, a distressingly out of
touch ruling given the "reality of family life" for children.76
The most credible explanation for the Alison D. court's
silence regarding the Braschi decision is that the court was simply
unwilling to provide legal recognition to actual, ongoing lesbian
family relationships. Braschi was in some respects an easy case for
the court. The issue was property, not personal relationships. The
apartment was Mr. Braschi's home for ten years -- he clearly was not
trying to sneak into a coveted rent controlled apartment -- and there
was no rational reason to force him to move out. But legally, the
only way Braschi would be able to remain in the apartment was via
his family relationship with his partner. Because the precipitating
event was Mr. Blanchard's death, the court was not asked to actually
give legal recognition to an existing relationship. The court only had
to recognize that the relationship had existed, so that Mr. Braschi

74id.
" Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989).
76Family law lawyers, among others, had a particularly strong reaction to the court's

unreasonable holding, finding it contrary to what they see as the true experiences of their
clients. These experiences often reflect the fact that many times children are raised by
"biological strangers" like stepparents. It may in fact be the case that a child develops
a closer relationship with a stepmother than she ever had with her biological mother.
See Leonard Florescue, Law Struggles with Gay ParentingIssues, 8 THE MATRIMONIAL
STRATEGIST 1 (1990); Leonard Florescue, Visitation Rights of Non-Biological Parents,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1990, at 3. The Commentary to N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §
70 offers a relatively lengthy analysis of the effect of Alison D. on the interpretation of
that statute, noting: "Alison D. overturns earlier decisions which had suggested that the
inherent power of the Supreme Court was broad enough to permit nonparents to apply
for habeas corpus writs."
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 Supplementary Practice
Commentaries at 27 (McKinney 1992).
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could not be evicted from the apartment that had been his anyway.
Though the building owner fought vigorously against Mr. Braschi,
there are only a limited number of rent controlled apartments. Of
those apartments, only a fraction are inhabited by families like Mr.
Braschi's. The Braschi ruling was thus highly unlikely to wreak
havoc with the rent control system.
Contrast this with Alison D., where the court was asked to
give legal recognition to an existing lesbian family relationship.
Alison D. was simultaneously a simple legal case and a profound
political case. It was simple because there are hundreds, if not
thousands, of cases in which courts have recognized the functional
parental relationship and given it some legal effect.77 Some courts
have created new equitable doctrines based on the simple notion that
it would be unwise and unfair not to recognize a family relationship
merely because there exists no technical legal relationship between
the parties.78 Alison's relationship with her son thus fit squarely into
settled legal doctrine; functional relationships will be recognized
when the goal of furthering the child's best interests is served.79
The much broader implications of a ruling in Alison D.'s
favor may have been apparent to the court. Unlike the term
"family," which is rarely used in statutory language, the term
"parent" is used throughout the law. Perhaps the court could not find
a way to limit a functional parental definition to only the visitation

See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
"In Atkinson v. Atkinson, the Michigan Court of Appeals created a new doctrine
entitled "equitable parenthood" to accommodate the relationship between a child and the
man found not to be the natural father. According to the court, a husband who is not
a biological father may be considered a natural father entitled to seek visitation rights
where: (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a parent-child relationship
or the mother of the child cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a
period of time; (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent; and (3)
the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child support. 408 N.W.2d
516, 519, appeal denied, 429 Mich. 884 (Ct. App. 1987).
" See supra note 32. It is also relatively well-settled in New York that lesbian and
gay parents shall not be denied parental rights on the basis of their sexual orientation.
M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 969 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (father's homosexuality did
not have an adverse affect on son, and father was entitled to modification of divorce
judgment to receive custody of 13-year old son); Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830,
831 (App. Div. 1984) (mere fact of parent's homosexuality does not, without more,
render parent unfit custodian and is a factor only if shown to affect child's welfare).
"
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context. It certainly could not have been that the court lacked either
the power"0 or the guidelines to define the term "parent. "s More
than likely, the court simply did not want to give its stamp of
approval to lesbian families, particularly lesbian couples who are
raising children together. After all, this case presented the court not
just with a challenging question of statutory interpretation, but
proposed a challenge to the court's traditional approach to the concept
of family, which has always presumed heterosexuality, biological
relationships, and/or marriage.
Recognizing Alison as a parent would have conferred more
than a legal right to seek visitation. It would have given legal and
social status to a form of family never before recognized. Perhaps
the court, in naively proselytizing about the reality of family life in
a context where the gay relationship was terminated by death, never
" According to Judge Kaye, the court possessed not only the power, but the
responsibility to further the child's interests by giving definition to undefined terms.
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 32-33 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a state supreme court not
only has the power to interpret a state statute, but the U.S. Supreme Court is bound by
the interpretation given to it. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542
(1992) (in interpreting a city ordinance, "we are bound by the construction given to it
by the Minnesota court."); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) ("[WIe
are dealing with a state statute on direct review of a state-court decision that has
construed the statute. Such a construction is binding on us."); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) ("We accept too, as we
must, the construction of the New York Legislature's language which the Court of
Appeals has put upon it."); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) ("The
interpretation by the Court of Appeals puts these words in the statute as definitely as if
it had been so amended by the legislature."); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926) ("Whether state statutes shall be construed one way or another is a state question,
the final decision of which rests with the courts of the State.").
"' Several formulations of the term "parent" were offered to the court by Alison D.'s
counsel, as well as many of the amici curiae who filed briefs on her behalf. As noted
by Judge Kaye, other courts were somehow able to fashion
a test for 'parental status' or 'in loco parentis' requiring that the
petitioner demonstrate actual assumption of the parental role and
discharge of parental responsibilities. It should be required that the
relationship with the child came into being with the consent of the
biological or legal parent, and that the petitioner at least have had
joint custody of the child for a significant amount of time.
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 32 (citation omitted).
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stopped to think of the impact of its statements on those who turn to
the courts to preserve our loving, on-going relationships, not just our
property interests. In this light, Braschi seems more like a cruel joke
played on lesbians and gay men, rather than a noteworthy departure
from the norm. With its ruling in Alison D., the court swung the
pendulum back so far that it knocked out not only lesbians raising
children, but stepparents and other family members raising children
without the benefit of adoption or biological parenthood to protect
their relationship.

B. In re Z.J.H.
In a similar vein, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relegated the
non-biological lesbian parent, who had been the child's primary
caregiver, to a legal status no better than the person next door. In In
re Z.J.H.,82 Wendy Sporleder and Janice Hermes were a lesbian
couple who had been together for eight years."3 They had hoped to
conceive by way of donor insemination, but turned to adoption after
Sporleder made several unsuccessful attempts to become pregnant."
Like most states, Wisconsin does not explicitly allow unmarried
couples to adopt jointly.a At the time, their only option seemed to
be to choose which one of them would adopt as a single parent, a
difficult decision given that the non-adoptive partner would be
without any official status as a parent.
The couple decided Hermes would be the adoptive parent, and
a child, Z.J.H., was placed in their home pursuant to a preadoption
placement.8 6 Sporleder, who was not working at the time, was the
primary caregiver, and Hermes kept her full-time job. 7 Seven

471 N.W.2d 202 (Vis. 1991).
'Id. at 204.
14

Id.

"sWisconsin's adoption statute provides, in part, that the following persons may
adopt a child: a husband and wife jointly, or either the husband or wife if the other
spouse is the child's parent, or an unmarried adult. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.82(1) (West
1987).
" In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 204.
7
8 Id.
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months after Z.J.H. was placed in their home, but before the
adoption was finalized, the women separated."8 At about the same
time, they entered into an agreement which allowed for visitation by
Sporleder, the non-custodial parent 8 9 After the adoption by Hermes
was formalized a month later, Hermes prohibited Sporleder from
seeing the child.'
Sporleder filed an action seeking custody,
visitation, and enforcement of the contract.9" The trial court
dismissed all claims on the grounds that Sporleder had no standing as
a legal parent,' and that the contract was void as against public
policy."
In seeking custody and visitation, Sporleder made three
primary arguments to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. First, she
claimed that her in loco parentis status entitled her to standing to seek
visitation and custody.9 Second, she argued that the court should
enforce the co-parenting agreement providing that the non-custodial
parent be granted liberal visitation and requiring the two women to
enter mediation. 95 Third, she argued that Hermes was equitably
estopped from denying Sporleder's parental role. 9' Over two strong
dissenting opinions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected
Sporleder's claims, departing from its own prior97 caselaw, which
recognized visitation rights of a functional parent.
In the prior case, In re D.M.M. ,9 an aunt sought visitation of
a child for whom she had been the legal guardian for six years. 99
The state statute explicitly authorized courts to grant visitation only
to a child's parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent.' o The court
uId.
8Id.
90Id.
91 Id.
92 In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 204 (citing Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d
571 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).

9Id.
9' id. at 204-05.

9' Id. at 204.
96 id. at 212.
97 See id. at 214 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
'6 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987).
9Id. at 532.
10 Id. at 535 (citing Wis. STAT. § 767.245(1) (1981)).
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determined that the state legislature had failed to define or modify the
term "parent" (as in "natural parent" or "biological parent"),
rendering the statute facially ambiguous. 0 ' To give definition to this
concededly ambiguous term, the court turned to Webster's
Dictionary," ° and found that "parent" includes "a person standing in
loco parentis although not a natural parent. "103
The court next turned to an analysis of the statute's legislative
history, to verify that the legislature, in enacting the visitation statute,
did not intend to restrict "parent" to natural parents only."'° A literal
interpretation of the statute, according to the court, would have the
effect of denying a child's adult brothers or sisters the opportunity to
petition for visitation. 05 Likewise, all persons that are not natural
parents (or grandparents or great-grandparents) would be precluded
from seeking visitation as well, an outcome that the court found
troublesome."° The court found that the potential results of this
literal interpretation of the statute "raise[ ] the issue of reasonableness
that the legislature would deny such persons in relationship to a child
a right to at least petition for visitation. "107
The court determined that the codification of visitation rights
by the state legislature was meant to reflect the common law, under
which individuals other than natural parents were entitled to standing
to seek visitation in appropriate cases.'0 8 The addition of the
"grandparents" and "great-grandparents" in the visitation statute,
according to the court, was meant to provide consistency for
grandparents and great-grandparents in courts throughout the state. 109
By adding these individuals, "[tihe legislature did not intend to
101Id. at 534.

"oId. "In order to determine if reasonably well-informed individuals would find a
person who, under court order, raised a child for almost six years to be a 'parent' under
the statute, it is proper to examine a standard dictionary." Id. (citing Figgs v. City of
Milwaukee, 357 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. 1984)).
103Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1967)) (footnote
omitted).
- In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d at 535.
105Id.
106 Id.
'OrId.

logId.
109
Id.
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supplant the common law that allowed other persons to petition for
visitation."'10 Rather, "[tihe legislature intended that the best interest
of the child should control the decision to grant visitation in all these
situations, which is the polestar of the statute.""' Since D.M.M.'s
aunt stood in loco parentis for many years, the court determined that
she was entitled to standing to seek visitation."'
The court in D.M.M. appeared to weigh two factors heavily
in arriving at its decision to grant the aunt standing. First, the aunt
had cared for D.M.M. for six years pursuant to an order of
guardianship, which conferred on her legal custody."' Second, the
aunt had a "bloodline relationship" with the child." 4 Yet, these factspecific considerations do not fully explain why the same court, four
years later in Z.J.H., recanted much of its analysis in D.M.M. In
fact, the Z.J.H. court totally recast its decision in D.M.M., stating
that the aunt had won her right to pursue visitation not as a "'parent,'
but as an 'other person."'"" This revisionist view is difficult to
absorb, since the court had undertaken such a lengthy-analysis of the
term "parent" in D.M.M., which it utterly refused to do when the
issue involved lesbians raising a child together. " 6
10

In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d at 536.

"I

Id. at 537.
at 534.

112 id.
1

As the court stated: "There is a distinction between a request for visitation ab

initio from a person who never had custody of the child and a visitation request from a
party who held custody under a valid custody order." Id.
..
4 The court stated:
A literal and exclusory reading of sec. 767.245 (4), Stats., would
mean that no adult brothers or sisters of the child would be able to
petition for visitation rights and yet they are members of the
bloodline family. It raises the issue of reasonableness that the
legislature would deny such persons in relationship to a child a right

to at least petition for visitation.
Id. at 535.
"s In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Wis. 1991) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
...
The relatively short duration of Ms. Sporleder's parental relationship with Z.J.H.
may have made it difficult for her to prove that it would be in the child's best interests
to maintain a relationship. Yet, as a one time custodial parent, whose long time partner
had clearly agreed to share the parenting relationship as a family, and agreed in writing
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While the court in D.M.M. went to great lengths to ensure
that the aunt was able to seek visitation, as it should have under the
circumstances, it exerted no effort to determine Sporleder's rights as
a lesbian co-parent. Instead of concluding, as it did in D.M.M., that
the term "parent" was not defined in the entire statutory chapter
addressing custody and visitation, the Z.J.H. court specifically looked
to provisions outside the statutory chapter at issue to find instances
where the term "parent" was restricted, in order to bolster its ruling
that Sporleder was not a parent."' Furthermore, the court expressed
deep concern in Z.J.H. that permitting "individuals standing in loco
parentis to obtain custody . . .would open the doors to multiple
parents claiming custody of children by virtue of their in loco parentis
status."118 Without some11limitations,
the court feared, "a child could
9
'parents.'
have multiple
The Z.J.H. court's reasons for denying Sporleder standing to
seek visitation strike to the core of the systemic problems faced by
lesbian couples and parents, whose families are not recognized by the
law. The court stated that its prior caselaw limited claims of
visitation to those situations in which an underlying action affecting
the family unit exists, such as a divorce action. 20 As long as the
family unit is intact, it is the parent's right, not the court's, to decide

to visitation after the couple's break up, Ms. Sporleder should at least have been granted
standing to prove her claim. The disingenuous recasting of the court's own decision in
D.M.M. can only be interpreted as an adverse reaction to lesbians raising children.
7 in re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 208.
8 ld.
, At this point, the court stated in a footnote its fear that it would be difficult to
keep "housekeepers, prior companions, day care providers and others" from seeking in
loco parentis status. Id. at 208 n.10. Not only may a court adopt narrowly drawn
guidelines to ensure against these situations, as discussed infra notes 175-187 and
accompanying text, but such guidelines were presented to the court by amici curiae.
"Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the rights and obligations of co-parents in
lesbian households using established legal protections generally reserved for 'traditional
nuclear families.'" Brief for Amici Curiae National Center for Lesbian Rights and
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 27, In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202
(Wis. 1991). Furthermore, the court's concern that a child will have multiple parents
seems out of sync with many children's reality, which includes stepparents and extended
family members. In addition, the Z.J.H. case did not involve multiple parents; rather,
it involved two parents - the biological and non-biological mothers.
In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 210.
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what relationships are in the child's best interests.121

argued the obvious:

Sporleder

that the reason this case was in court was

because herfamily unit was no longer intact, challenging the court's
view that the only conceivable family unit is Hermes and her adoptive
son. In a surreal example of how heterosexist presumptions erase
lesbian and gay reality, the court responded that Sporleder had
obviously missed the point of prior cases arguing the intact family
rationale:
The rationale behind these cases was that the
legislature did not intend to override a parent's
determination of visitation unless an underlying action
affecting the family unit had been filed, because in
such an instance, orderingvisitation with non-parents
may help to mitigate the trauma and impact of a
dissolvingfamily relationship.22
Many aspects of this reasoning are troublesome for lesbian
families. First, it falsely assumes that all families may file actions
which enable them to be in court in the first place. Second, by
implicitly referring to Sporleder as a "non-parent," it fails to
acknowledge in loco parentis status, contrary to the court's reliance
on its own doctrine as set forth in D.M.M.'23 Finally, and most

121Id. (quoting Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Wis. Ct. App.

1987)). Because lesbian couples cannot marry, and thus cannot divorce, and are not
otherwise granted the legal recognition that could provide them with an underlying
claim, one might argue that lesbian co-parents in this situation are denied due process
of law. Laws that preclude lesbian non-biological parents from even attempting to obtain
standing to seek visitation create an irrebuttable presumption that visitation by a lesbian
co-parent is never in the child's best interests, a position argued by the American Civil
Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union as amici curiae in Alison D.
"[A] rule which would deny standing to anyone but the biological parent to argue that
continued visitation is in the best interest of the child unconditionally deprives children
and co-parents of their constitutionally protected rights." Brief Amici Curiae of the
American Civil Liberties Union and New York Civil Liberties Union at 16, Alison D.
v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
"' In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 210 (citing In re Soergel, 453 N.W.2d 624, 631
(Wis. 1990) and Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987)) (emphasis added).
'13 In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Wis. 1987).
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deplorably, it implicitly assumes that only the dissolution of families
who can claim an underlying action cause trauma worth mitigating by
ordering visitation. Because lesbian families can neither unite nor
dissolve with legal sanction, the court assumes there to be no purpose
to ordering visitation with the non-legal parent."
In addition to her statutory claims, Sporleder alleged that the
contract between herself and Hermes was entitled to enforcement.25
The court held that "in light of the societal and constitutional interests
in maintaining the relationship between a natural or adoptive parent
and that parent's child, public policy concerns militate against
contractual provisions affecting this relationship.""26 Thus, the court
would void any agreement between lesbian co-parents with regard to
the care, custody, and visitation of a child, finding that these rights
are statutorily governed." 7
Finally, the court addressed Sporleder's equitable estoppel
claim, which argued that Hermes was equitably estopped from
denying Sporleder's status as Z.J.H.'s parent. 2 Sporleder and
Hermes had planned to share parenting as a family. Before the
adoption, Sporleder had attempted to become pregnant, with no
success. She and Hermes then decided to adopt, agreeing for
whatever reason that Hermes would be the adoptive parent and that
Sporleder would stay home to care for the child. Relying on
Hermes' promises of shared parenting, Sporleder agreed that Hermes
would be the sole adoptive parent, and she in fact became the
primary caregiver to the child placed with them for adoption.
However, the court, rather than attempt to analyze the elements of

22

Interviews with children of lesbians would reveal a very different viewpoint.

There is no reason to believe that children do not develop the same loving and close
relationship with a functional non-biological parent that they do with a functional
biological parent. See generally DIFFERENT MOTHERS: SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF
LESBIANS TALK ABOUT THEIR LNvEs (Louise Rafkin ed., 1990).
"
12

In reZ.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 211.

id.

I27Id.
" Id. at 212. An equitable estoppel claim is based on an "(1) action or non-action
which induces (2) reliance by another (3) to his detriment." In re D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d
283, 287 (Wis. 1987). Equitable estoppel was also claimed in Alison D., though both
appellate courts failed to address it. For a full discussion of equitable claims in a lesbian
co-parent context see Polikoff, supra note 7, at 491-502.
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estoppel, dismissively discussed the claim by stating merely that
equitable estoppel is generally used as a defensive shield, and not
affirmatively to claim new rights.129 In Wisconsin, the court noted,
equitable estoppel has never been used "against a natural/adoptive
parent for the purpose of awarding custody to a non-parent." 30 The
court, apparently, was not willing to extend this common law
doctrine in a lesbian family context.
The majority's decision in Z.J.H. drew two strong and
noteworthy dissents. Justice Abrahamson addressed the contractual
claim, arguing rather forcefully that contracts involving the care and
financial support of children are not per se violations of public
policy, since "numerous contracts affect the parental relationship."131
Rather, Wisconsin's policy favoring freedom to contract and the
courts' mandate to protect the best interests of the child may be
reconciled by allowing the court to review such an agreement and
enforce it to the extent that it does not conflict with the child's best
32
interests. 1
Justice Bablitch, in dissent, took a broader view, calling on
the court to protect the rights of children in non-traditional
Failure
relationships on par with children in traditional families.'

In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Wis. 1991).

Id. The Court glossed over the fact that estoppel is a common law equity
doctrine which it could certainly have applied to this case. Equitable doctrines have
always been used to fill the gap between the law and reality. Where one is not, is
claimed not to be, or claims not to be a biological father, the courts have stepped in with
equitable principles to create the fiction of parenthood or, at least, to impose the
responsibilities of parenthood. See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 492-94. Two trial courts
have allowed non-biological/adoptive lesbian mothers to prove their claims. Sabol v.
Bowling, No. CF-27-024 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1989); Carney v. Dianna, No. 89191-039/CE 99949 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1990).
"' In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 213 (Abrahamson, J.,dissenting).
132 Id.
3 Id. at 214 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
"~

Everyone agrees that children of a dissolving traditional
relationship deserve and need the protection of the courts. Yet the
majority opinion holds that children of a dissolving non-traditional
relationship are not entitled to the same protection. What logic
compels that result? The legislature could not have intended such an
absurd and cruel result, but that is what the majority of this court has
determined.
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to fully consider the claims of non-legal parents in this kind of case
means that the interests of children of non-biological families will
never be considered, denying them "any legal significance. 1 1 4 Only
Justice Bablitch was honest enough to recognize that the majority's
view was undoubtedly "greatly influenced by the facts.
Different facts would, it is hoped, yield a different result." 35

C. Views of Other Courts
Alison D. and Z.J.H. are not the only cases to address the
legal interests of lesbian co-parents. Their significance lies in the fact
that they are the only two cases from the highest courts of their
respective states, and are the final word on the legal claims they
addressed. In each case, the majority decisions in both Alison D. and
Z.J.H. drew strong dissenting opinions, indicating that judicial
dialogue on the issue of lesbian co-parent custody and visitation suits
has just begun. Finally, the courts in each case seemed to ignore or
distort its own prior precedents that could clearly have resulted in a
ruling on behalf of the lesbian non-biological mothers.
The very day that the Alison D. case was argued to New
York's highest court, the California Court of Appeal issued its
decision in Nancy S. v. Michele G.136 Nancy S. and Michele G. were
a lesbian couple that had been in a relationship for sixteen years,
during which they planned for and had two children, using donor
insemination as the means of conception.137 Nancy was the biological
mother of both children.13 When they separated in 1985, they
agreed that the older child, K., would live with Michele, and S.
would live with Nancy, although each child would have extensive
visitation with each parent. 39 After living with this arrangement for
three years, Nancy wanted to change the agreement, from one in

Id.
134

1S
'
9

Id. at 215.
Id.
279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 216.

138Id.

19 Id.
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which each parent had sole custody of one child, to one of shared
custody of both children. Michele opposed the change; attempts to
mediate were unsuccessful.
Nancy then initiated a Uniform
4
Parentage Act proceeding," seeking a declaration of her sole
parental rights, sole legal and physical custody of both children, and
that any visitation of the children require her consent.141

The trial court ruled that Michele was not a parent under the
Uniform Parentage Act. 42 The court further determined that even if
Michele G. could prove de facto parent status, it could not grant her
custody over the natural parent's objections.14 Sole physical and
1
legal custody were awarded to Nancy S., and Michele appealed. "4
The appellate court declined to use its equitable powers to
allow Michele the right to seek custody of K. and visitation with S.
Despite recognizing that de facto parents have some rights with
regard to guardianship and dependency proceedings, and that Michele

may well have the status of a de facto parent, the court held that a de
facto parental relationship was not enough to challenge a biological
mother for custody.1 45 Like the New York Court of Appeals in
Alison D. v. Virginia M., the California court emphasized the
"critical importance . . . of the right to parent .. 146 Only upon
a showing of parental unfitness, the court noted, may one who is not

140Id.

at 215.

141 Id.
4

Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.

143Id.

14 Id.

"4Id. at 216. This was not the first California case on this issue. In Curiale v.
Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeal refused to accept
subject matter jurisdiction because the lesbian co-parent was not a parent. In contrast,
because Michele G. had always claimed to be parent, the court extended its jurisdiction
to determine if she was a parent who had a right to custody. Given the court's ultimate
conclusion that Michele was not a de facto parent entitled to a hearing on whether it was
in the child's best interests to remain in her custody, this seems to be merely a
distinction without a difference. Prior to Curiale or Nancy S., however, a trial court in
California ruled in favor of a lesbian non-biological mother who sought visitation after
her separation from the child's biological mother. Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1985). See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 533-35 for a more
complete discussion.
"4 Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (citing In re Jenkens, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334
(1981)) (internal citations omitted in original).
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a biological or adoptive parent seek custody. 47
Unlike either New York or Wisconsin, the Uniform Parentage
Act adopted by California does define "parent" as "one who is the
natural or adoptive parent of a child," making it a more difficult
statutory interpretation case. 1 48 Yet, it is difficult not to be suspicious
of the court's feigned powerlessness in lesbian parenting cases like
Nancy S. Some months after the appellate court's decision in Nancy
S. v. Michele G., a California trial court ruled that a man who helped
raise his former girlfriend's child for a relatively brief period of time
was entitled to full parental rights, even though he is not the
biological father nor was he married to the biological mother. 149 In
so ruling, the court relied heavily on the fact that the child's mother
lied to the child and misled him in believing that the boyfriend was
his father.'
Obviously, statutory definitions and appellate court
holdings are readily disregarded in California where adherence would
result in denying a man who thought he was the child's father from
maintaining his relationship with the child. According to reports of
the case, the court made no pretense of concern for the biological
mother's rights, which play such a decisive role in decisions
involving lesbian co-parents.
While it would be difficult for a lesbian biological mother to
falsely lead her child to believe that the functional mother is also a

" Id. (citing In re Jenkens, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (Ct. App. 1981)). The court
also rejected other equitable claims such as in loco parentis, equitable estoppel, and any
other functional definition of parent. Id. at 216-19.
IId. at 215 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001 (West 1983)).
'

A brief Boston Globe article reported as follows:
A man who helped raise his ex-girlfriend's child has won full
parental rights to the 4-year old boy even though he is not the child's
biological father. Superior Court Judge Dana Senit Henry awarded
parental rights Tuesday to Larry McLinden Sr., an investment
banker, because the boy's mother led McLinden and the boy, Larry,
Jr., to believe they were father and son. "Larry Jr. has never known
any other father," the judge said. "To not recognize Larry as an
equitable parent would be to denigrate the basic philosophy of family
law."

Nonfather Gets Parental Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1991, at 4.
ISOId.
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biological parent, the fact is that lesbians do create. a family
atmosphere in which children come to trust that both parents will care
for them equally, that they are loved by both, and that they can
depend on both parents in the long run. Given the emotional bonds
created in these families, it is absurd to pretend that the impact of
losing contact and a relationship with one of the mothers, merely
because the lack of a biological connection does not afford her legal
standing, is any less significant for the child."' It is difficult not to
draw the somewhat cynical conclusion that, in California, strict
definitions of the term "parent" are inapplicable when the opportunity
to preserve a heterosexual relationship and a traditional, male-headed
household is at stake. For, in terms of the child's interest in
continuing a relationship with a functional parent she has come to
love, what else is the distinction between the functional straight father
and the functional lesbian mothers in the California cases? And, what
could possibly be the difference from a constitutional or legally
protective perspective between a straight, unmarried mother who
lived with a man and a lesbian, unmarried mother who lived with a
woman?
Perhaps these slightly earlier cases paved the way for
subsequent courts to digest the concept of lesbian co-parents before
ruling, and to rule according to the child's best interests. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court had erred in holding
that co-parenting agreements between lesbians are unenforceable as
a matter of law. In A. C. v. C.B. ,152 the court set aside the lower
court's dismissal of a non-biological mother's petition to seek
visitation or custody with the child she co-parented with her female
partner of many years.'
Although there are limits on a parent's
ability to enter into agreements regarding the custody of children,"
the court ruled that the non-biological lesbian mother had stated a
"colorable claim" for a continued relationship with the child,' 55 and

,'5 Clearly this fact has been recognized when the biological mother has died and
courts have found that a continuous relationship with the surviving partner/parent is best
for the child. See In re Pearlman, No. 87-24926 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989).
S 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
SId. at 661.
"

'

Id. at 663-64.
id. at 665.
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that such claim should be given a full evidentiary hearing to ensure
protection of the child's best interests."5 6 The issue "cannot be
resolved as a matter of law based on the perceived morality or
immorality of the parent's conduct."" 7
Similar to Justice
Abrahamson's dissent in Z.J.H., the New Mexico court recognized
that co-parenting agreements, though enforceable, may be "subject to
judicial modification when such modification is in the best interests
of the child. "19
The broadest ruling in favor of a non-biological lesbian
mother was issued by a trial court in Boulder, Colorado, which
awarded full custody of a six-year old girl to a lesbian non-biological
mother after the couple's separation." 6 In Briggs v. Newingham, the
couple decided that one partner would be artificially inseminated and
the other partner would serve as the primary child care provider.' 61
In awarding custody to Briggs, the non-biological parent, the judge
determined that Briggs was the child's "psychological" 162 parent, and
that granting her custody would be in the child's best interest. 163
Visitation was awarded to the biological mother. 1

Id. at 663, 666.
257 Id. at 665.
In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 213 (Wis. 1991).
'59 A.C., 829 P.2d at 664.
' ColoradoJudge Awards Custody to Lesbian Co-Parent, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES
(Lesbian & Gay Law Assoc. of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Summer 1992, at 54.
6
d.
" The concept of the "psychological" parent was originally proposed by Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit in their book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, which offered
guidelines for judicial decision-making in cases involving children. A central element
of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's approach "focuses on a child's primary attachment to
her psychological parent, who may or may not be the child's biological parent." Nadine
Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud,and Solnit's Proposals:An Introductory
Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 485, 485 (1983-84). Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit contend that "a child's developmental needs are best served by
continuing the child's relationship with her psychological parent, and that disruption of
the bond between a child and her psychological parent affects the future pathology of the
child." Id. at 486 (footnote omitted).
" ColoradoJudge Awards Custody to Lesbian Co-Parent, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES
(Lesbian & Gay Law Assoc. of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Summer 1992, at 54.

164 Id.
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IV. The Future of Lesbian Co-Parent Litigation
It is tempting to conclude that the lesson drawn from these
cases is that courts are overwhelmingly hostile to lesbians who share
parenting. While appellate courts have certainly not made any
attempt to reach out and grapple with the fact that lesbian families
exist, there may be a more moderate conclusion to draw. Simply
put, courts prefer bright lines. Adoption is one such bright line.
As mentioned briefly, lesbian non-biological parents have
successfully adopted as second parents in several jurisdictions
throughout the country.16 5 While the family unit is intact and
functioning happily, courts have easily seen that the child's best
interests are well served by the law's recognition that both women are
parents. The California Court of Appeals sent a clear message on the
issue of lesbian second parent adoption in Nancy S. v. Michele G. '
Citing the state adoption provision that provides "[a]ny unmarried
minor child may be adopted by any adult person," 67 the court stated:
"Wesee nothing in these provisions that would preclude a child from
being jointly adopted by someone of the same sex as the natural
parent. "6 Judge Kaye seemed to leave an opening for second parent
adoptions in her dissent in Alison D. v. Virginia M.169 This option,
however, is still extremely limited at this point and is entirely
dependent on each individual judge's willingness to interpret state
adoption laws to allow the second parent adoption without terminating
70
the biological mother's parental relationship.1
As a result, it is essential that advocates for lesbian mothers

16

See supra note 17.

'"272 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
IId. at 219 n.8 (citing CAL. CiV. CODE § 221 (West 1982)).
6 Id. (citation omitted).
'""Whilethe opinion speaks of biological and legal parenthood, this Court has not
yet passed on the legality of adoption by a second mother." Alison D. v. Virginia M.,
572 N.E.2d 27, 30 n.1 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
7 For instance, in Vermont, an Addison County judge permitted a second parent
adoption, as it was in the child's best interests. Inre R.C., 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1103 (Jan. 7, 1992). Yet, a judge in Washington county refused to grant a second
parent adoption by a lesbian non-biological mother who petitioned to adopt the two
children she is raising with her partner. In re B.L.V.B., No. 92-321 (Vt. P. Ct., June
18, 1992).
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continue to develop theories and strategies based on the real life
experiences of lesbians who are parenting, and to shun the idealized,
moralistic rules imposed on heterosexual relationships. Where
children exist and have begun to develop relationships with adults
who are raising them as parents, it is too late to worry about whether
the parents fit the ideal of "family," since the children's interests
rarely turn on ideals, but reality -- who feeds, clothes, and loves
them on a daily basis.
In most respects, lesbian couples, by necessity, approach
parenting very differently than do heterosexual couples.
For
example, pregnancy for lesbian couples does not usually occur by
mistake. Rather, the decision to have a child is arrived at after a
long, reflective process, involving which of the two women will
biologically bear the child, whether to use a known or unknown
donor, who, if either, will be the primary caregiver, how they will
ensure that the child and the outside world responds to them both as
the parents, how custody and visitation will be arranged should the
biological mother die or should the couple separate, and hundreds of
other considerations."' Likewise, adoption is more complicated for
lesbian couples than it is for heterosexual couples. Most states allow
only married couples to jointly adopt, but are silent with regard to
unmarried couples, forcing lesbian couples to choose between which
of them will be the legally recognized adoptive parent. In most
instances still, lesbians are not "out" in the adoption process for fear
of homophobia and prejudice on the part of the agency, the home
study worker, or the judge.
Establishing legal recognition of lesbian-headed families
requires us to start with the premise that both lesbian parents, the
biological and non-biological alike, must be recognized as full legal
parents for all purposes related to custody and visitation.' 72 In a
17' CHERI PIES, CONSIDERING PARENTHOOD (1988).
172Admittedly,

some lesbian family advocates would not put the non-biological/non-

legal mother on absolute equal footing with the biological/adoptive mother, preferring
to follow some of the law's preferences for the biological mother. They would be
cautious about extending more than limited rights, like visitation, to the non-biological
mother. My view on this is based upon what I hear from lesbian mothers themselves,
who are desperately concerned that the non-biological/adoptive parent be fully
recognized, both socially and legally. In fact, it is frequently the biological mother who
is most vocal regarding this concern. They are the ones putting themselves on equal
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lesbian family context, biology must be separated from the
determination of who is a parent. In custody or visitation disputes
with the non-biological mother, where both have clearly agreed to
share parenting, the biological lesbian mother should not have the
legal advantage solely because of the legal privilege that her genetic
link provides her. Insistence that biological mothers retain that
privilege defies the very agreements entered into by a great number
of lesbian co-parents themselves, whose desire it is that both of them
be recognized by law.173 Naturally, when conflict arises, the
biological mothers will rely on the advantage the law gives them,
regardless of the "lesbian ethic" that we honor our agreements with
each other with regard to parenting. Such insistence also prevents the
courts from ever considering the child's best interests, as the nonbiological mother will forever lack legal standing to bring a claim.
Giving legal preference to the biological lesbian mother will maintain
an unequal, and in this context an inequitable, status between the two

women. 74 The biological mother retains the power of knowing that
the existing legal system will back her up, at least vis-a-vis the nonbiological mother.

Just as courts have developed approaches for finding that

footing as much as possible by drafting documents, giving the child both of their
surnames, pttting both of their names on the birth certificates, and holding each mother
out as a parent to family, teachers, friends, and those with whom they come into contact
in their daily lives. Their wishes and actions deserve to be followed.
" By the same token, genetic relationship alone should not determine whether a
sperm donor is a father. That determination should be based upon the parties' agreement
and, in some instances, their actions subsequent to the agreement. If the donor has
agreed to waive his parental rights in exchange for the lesbian mother's agreement not
to seek child support from him, that agreement should be honored and enforced. The
donor's genetic relationship, standing alone, should never entitle him to circumvent the
original agreement.
74 For example, the non-biological mother would be forced to argue that the
biological mother is unfit in order to seek custody. The wisdom of rules that require
individuals who are not parents to meet such a standard before they can obtain custody
is not questioned. However, the very premise of this article is that both individuals in
lesbian-headed families have agreed to be co-equal parents, have functioned as such, and
are both parents. It would be inconsistent with their agreement and, potentially,
contrary to the child's best interests to treat them differently.
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heterosexual men may maintain parental rights as a functional
parent,"' criteria may be developed to recognize the functional
lesbian parent. Though admittedly very narrow, these criteria may
include the following factors:
(1) Is the woman seeking legal recognition as a
parent the partner of the biological/adoptive mother?
(2) Was she involved in the initial decision to
conceive or adopt the child?
(3) Was it the agreement of both women that they be
co-equal parents to the child?
(4) Has the woman seeking recognition abided by
that agreement by living with the child and actually
provided care to the child on a daily basis?
The first requirement squarely focuses the case on lesbian
couples having children, in part as a defensive response to feminist

concerns that the criteria for functional parents not be so broad as to
allow heterosexual former boyfriends to use custody and visitation
actions to interfere with women's lives. 76 It also eliminates genetic

17 See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, appeal denied, 429 Mich. App. 884

(Ct. App. 1987) (developing theory of "equitable parenthood" to protect parental rights
of man who discovered at divorce that he was not the child's biological father).
176Many straight feminists have expressed strong reservations about the functional
parent approach, fearing that it may provide a potent weapon to men who may use
custody actions to harass women and children. While a few lent considerable support
to presenting the case of Alison D. v. Virginia M. to the New York Court of Appeals,
their suggested criteria for defining "parent," I fear, were drafted more with heterosexual
mothers in mind than with lesbians seeking recognition as parents as the forefront
consideration. As a result, the criteria reflect a defensive posture against men rather
than an affirmative reflection of lesbian reality. In its amicus curiae brief, NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, which had been tremendously supportive of lesbian family
cases, proposed to the court the following guidelines for defining "parent": "(1) the
adult has lived with the child for a substantial period of time; (2) the adult has personally
performed the caretaking duties of a parent on a significant basis and for a significant
period of time; and (3) the biological or adoptive parent having custody of the child has
expressly consented to the establishment of a parent-child relationship giving rise to legal
rights." Brief of Amici Curiae of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
National Organization for Women of New York State at 8, Alison D. v. Virginia M.,
572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). Similar criteria were proposed in an amici brief written
by Professors David Chambers and Martha Minow. See Brief for Amici Curiae Eleven
Concerned Academics at 20, Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
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donors who have not functioned as fathers and who share no family
relationship of any kind with the lesbian couple. If the person
seeking visitation or custody does not share a close, committed family
relationship 77 with the biological mother, she must resort to other
non-parent theories. This provision certainly alleviates courts' rather
unfounded fears that housekeepers and school teachers will somehow
be able to assume functional parent status.178 It does not, however,
contemplate lesbian stepparents, t79 but rather allows for the
determination of who are the primary parents. 80

Soon after the decision in Alison D., Professor Minow expressed doubts about
the development of a functional parent approach. The examples she used to support her
concern, while somewhat useful, have two shortcomings. First, some of the examples
illustrate bad policy decisions for all families, not necessarily the weaknesses of a
functional family approach. See Minow, supra note 8, at 279. Second, she speaks only
of heterosexually created families in every one of her examples. She describes the
Alison D. case as simply "two unmarried people who lived together for several years
[and] decided to have a child." Id. at 269. Only vague reference is made to the fact
that they are lesbians: "Because the two people are both women, they turned to artificial
insemination." Id. Such a failure to discuss the ramifications of Alison D. for lesbians
further underscores the necessity for lesbian focused jurisprudence. "If feminist legal
theory is derived from a feminist method uninformed by critical lesbian experience, the
theory will be incomplete." Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the
Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 191, 191 (1989-90). While it is crucial that the
efforts of lesbian family advocates not adversely effect straight women, it is also crucial
that the fear of potential harm to straight women not be used as a justification to inhibit
lesbians' ability to secure family rights. For, like Professor Minow, I, too, worry about
these cases "being in court in the first place." When I worry as a lawyer, I worry for
some of the same reasons as Professor Minow. But, as a lesbian and lesbian family
advocate, I worry mostly about all the lesbian mothers who worry, constantly, about the
vulnerability and potential loss of their families, whom they love.
'"See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
'7 See In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 208 n.10 (Wis. 1991).
' Lesbian stepparents would include the subsequent partner of either of the child's
primary parents after the primary parents have separated. See generally Elizabeth
Zuckerman, Second ParentAdoptionfor Lesbian-ParentedFamilies: Legal Recognition
of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 729 (1986).
"SO
Nor does this approach rule out a known donor, if it is agreed that he will be an
acknowledged father. While tradition strongly advances the myth that a child may only
have two parents, most children of divorced parents readily incorporate stepparents into
their lives. Likewise, the law has, when in the child's best interests, recognized two
fathers or two mothers. See Mark V. v. Gale P., 540 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (Fain. Ct.
1990) (granting primary custodial rights to biological father and secondary subordinate
rights to stepfather); Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 325-26 (W. Va. 1989)
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The second requirement places the non-biological parent at the
moment of conception, so to speak, and emphasizes the mutual
interdependence of the decision. Mutual interdependence in the
decision-making process is typical in lesbian couples; it would be
atypical for one member of a couple to conceive or to make the
decision to conceive unilaterally. Pregnancy, for most members of
a lesbian couple, is generally not an accident or the result of
carelessness. Much of the early decision-making between women in
a lesbian couple revolves around which of them will or is able to
conceive or adopt. If the decision to conceive or adopt was a joint
one, dependent on the contribution of time, energy, and thought of
both women, it may offer proof of the women's intent to jointly
parent. One court has held that a lesbian non-biological parent may
be considered to have "born" or "begotten" the child, and thus, is
obligated for pay child support after the couples' separation.'' Had
it not been for the promises made by the non-biological mother to
care for them, the children would not have come into the world.' 2
The third requirement satisfies important concerns about the
biological mother's consent to her partner's role as a co-equal parent
in the child's life. As stated, many biological lesbian mothers choose
to raise children with their partners and want those partners to be
fully recognized as parents. The emphasis here is on the biological
mother's pre-conception/pre-adoption, rather than post-break up,
choices. The courts tend to take the patronizing view that biological
mothers need to be protected from these choices, and give effect only
to the choice that eliminates the functional parent from the child's

(granting custody to biological father and visitation to stepfather); Collins v. Gilbreath,
403 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (granting custody to biological father and
visitation to stepfather); Cooper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978)
(granting custody to biological mother and visitation to stepmother). Cf. Michael D.L.
v. Martha P. and Charles P., N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1990, at 28 (Fam. Ct. May 10, 1990)
(holding that married, biological mother is equitably estopped from preventing biological
father from claiming paternity). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118
(1989) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) ("California law, like nature itself, makes no
provision for dual fatherhood.").
'
Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
2id. at 783-84.
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life."' 3 This criterion attempts to give effect to the lesbian biological
mother's choice to co-parent.18
At the same time, the need to be certain of the biological
mother's consent cannot be diminished. Despite the need to break
away somewhat from a strict, biologically defined outcome on
parenting rights, nine months of pregnancy, labor, and childbirth
certainly puts the birth mother in a different posture from her partner.
She certainly retains the sole right to make decisions related to her
body's reproductive capacity. As a result, it is not inconsistent with
the goals of legal recognition for lesbian co-parents to require clear
proof that the biological mother agreed to share parenting rights and
responsibilities with her partner. Likewise, though the concern is
understandably a lesser one, this requirement addresses the
coextensive consent of the non-biological mother to assume the full
obligations of parenting, including support. While the law is often
stingy in doling out parental rights, it is a great deal more likely to
impose the burdens of parenting."' Indicia of consent may include
written or oral agreements, adding the non-biological mother's name
to the birth certificate (if allowed in the state), the child's name,
which may include family names of both women, the assumption of
joint decision-making with regard to the child, or the child's
relationships with each woman's blood family."8 6
In lesbian families, the consent element is generally fairly
clear. The decision by a lesbian couple to become parents is often a
very public event within the community involving discussions with
friends, family, support groups, other lesbian parents, and medical
professionals, among others. Typically, the couple will present to all
those that they speak with their intention to co-parent, creating a
number of witnesses to their decision. It is the unusual case where
the consent of the biological mother is unclear. Where it is unclear,

'a See Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (N.Y. 1987) (long term
functional father denied visitation rights).
25 Heterosexual mothers may not have chosen to engage in lifelong co-parenting
relationships with the men who happened to impregnate them, but the law imposes on
these women the obligation to share parenting, regardless of their choice.
l See Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1989).
' There are many more means to show a mother's consent. It is most important
not to single out any one factor, such as an express agreement, but to look at the whole
picture.
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these criteria allow the court to weigh that factor in deciding whether
to confer standing.
Finally, the fourth criterion addresses the central premise of
this whole discussion. That is, did the woman actually function as a
parent to the child in question? Assisting in childbirth, taking time
from work, living with the child, and the level of participation in the
day-to-day emotional and financial care of the child are some of the
factors to consider. Contrary to the criteria presented to the courts
by some amici curiae groups,"' I would not require that the lesbian
co-parent performed caregiving duties over a significant period of
time as an element of the right to be determined to be a parent. My
fear, of course, is that no time period would be significant enough for
a court to recognize a lesbian co-parent. More importantly, the
question of the significance of the caregiving over any period of time
is more relevant to the granting of custody or visitation, not to
standing to be declared a parent. For instance, if the non-biological
mother stayed at home for two years to care for the child as the
primary caregiver, it may be in the child's best interests to award her
custody. If the non-biological mother worked sixty hours a week
during the same time frame, while the biological mother provided
primary caregiving, joint custody or visitation may better serve the
child's interests. In either event, the time frame is relevant only to
the level of continued relationship she may have with the child, not
to whether she is a parent, assuming the other criteria are met. Just
as two primary genetic parents are assumed to have- full legal
relationships with their children, so too should a lesbian couple who
meet these criteria be recognized.
Judicial adoption of these criteria would require the courts to
do no more than what they have traditionally done, when adhering to
strict definitions of "parent" would not serve the child's best interests.
These criteria attempt to address the needs of a very specific and
limited category of individuals, lesbian couples and their children.
They are not developed to apply to heterosexual parents, as they are
taken only from lesbian parenting experiences. I cannot say that
presenting these specific criteria to any of the courts in the cases
discussed above would have yielded a more satisfactory result for
these mothers and children. But, over the long term, the concerns of
17

See supra note 176.
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lesbians can only be addressed when lesbian experiences, as unique
from those of men and heterosexual women, are used as the basis for
the law's development.
These concerns are not just for ourselves, but for our
children, who have been rendered legal "nonentities" by these
decisions." Merely because they are viewed as having a "nontraditional parental relationship," their "interests will not even be
considered." It might be the wiser in some cases to mediate disputes
over custody and visitation rather than present them to the courts, not
just because of our fear of judicial hostility, but because mediation
and agreement between parents are generally favored in family
disputes. But when we cannot agree, and are forced into a legal
system of rules that were not created for our families, we have no
choice but to propose solutions and guidelines to the courts that
reflect our experiences, rather than trying to fit ourselves into the
already confusing matrix of heterosexual family rights.
Our
guidelines should reflect not just a functional approach to determining
who is a parent in a lesbian family context, but also the message that
lesbian parenting carries with it many positive, affirming features for
our children. The courts should not judge us otherwise.

